Trump and Xi’s Upcoming Meeting: A Focus on Taiwan

Xi Jinping’s decision to pick up the phone and call President Trump is not routine diplomacy. It is a warning shot wrapped in polite language, and the central flashpoint is Taiwan. With a face-to-face Trump–Xi meeting set for April, both leaders are maneuvering to frame the agenda, test each other’s red lines, and shape how the world reads the balance of power in the western Pacific.

Context of the Call — Taiwan

According to official readouts from both capitals, Xi Jinping’s recent call with Trump covered a familiar list: Taiwan, trade, and the broader global security environment, including the grinding war in Ukraine. The unusual part is who initiated the conversation. Beijing, not Washington, reached out, at a moment when Chinese spokespeople are once again stressing that they “absolutely will not” renounce the option of force to resolve the Taiwan question.

That statement builds on years of similar rhetoric. In major party congress speeches and anniversary addresses, Xi has repeatedly described unification with Taiwan as “inevitable,” while reserving the right to use “all necessary means” if peaceful efforts fail. Taiwan’s government, for its part, has answered with its own steady refrain: it is already a self-governing democracy and has no interest in trading that reality for Beijing’s offer of “one country, two systems,” particularly after watching how that framework collapsed in Hong Kong.

The United States sits in the middle of this clash with a deliberately fuzzy posture. Since 1979, Washington has followed a policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan: it sells arms to help the island defend itself, maintains deep unofficial ties, and signals that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are a vital U.S. interest, but it does not explicitly promise to fight if China attacks. That ambiguity is anchored in the Taiwan Relations Act, a law that commits the United States to provide defensive capabilities and to regard any non-peaceful effort to determine Taiwan’s future as a matter of “grave concern,” without spelling out automatic military intervention.

Xi’s call to Trump now tests how long that balancing act can hold. By putting Taiwan at the center of their conversation, Beijing is effectively demanding a clearer sense of where the United States will draw the line and how far Trump is willing to go to manage or confront Chinese power.

Implications for Taiwan’s Security

The renewed attention to Taiwan comes amid an unmistakable pattern of Chinese coercive pressure. People’s Liberation Army aircraft and vessels routinely probe around the island, crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait and entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in large formations designed to wear down pilots and strain readiness. Those activities have increased in tempo around election periods in Taiwan and after high-level visits by U.S. officials.

From Taipei’s perspective, Xi’s phone call and the upcoming meeting with Trump cannot be separated from this military backdrop. When Beijing says it will not rule out force against Taiwan, and simultaneously surges ships and bombers near the island, the message is clear: patience has limits.

For Washington, that raises three uncomfortable questions.

First, can strategic ambiguity still deter both sides? The theory has always been that Beijing will hesitate to attack because it cannot be sure how the United States would respond, and that Taiwan will hesitate to declare formal independence because it cannot be certain the United States would back such a move. Critics now argue that Chinese capabilities have grown so much, and Xi’s rhetoric has hardened so far, that ambiguity risks being read as weakness.

Second, are current U.S. security guarantees to Taiwan actually credible in practical terms? War games and defense analysis show that defending the island would be an extremely difficult operation, requiring forward-positioned munitions, resilient logistics, and close coordination with allies such as Japan and Australia. If Trump signals too much flexibility in his upcoming talks, Beijing may conclude that American planners are not willing to absorb those costs.

Third, how does Taiwan itself interpret these moves? Taipei has been investing in asymmetric capabilities—missiles, drones, mobile air defenses—precisely because it cannot assume that outside help will arrive quickly enough in a crisis. A Trump–Xi meeting that leans heavily toward “managing differences” without a clear reaffirmation of support could reinforce fears that Taiwan will be left to face China largely on its own.

Strategic ambiguity under pressure

The April meeting will likely put the future of strategic ambiguity on the table, whether openly or behind closed doors. Some U.S. analysts have called for a shift toward strategic clarity, arguing that Washington should declare plainly that it will defend Taiwan against unprovoked aggression and treat the island as a de facto security partner. Others warn that such a move could provoke the very conflict it is meant to prevent, by convincing Beijing that time is no longer on its side.

Trump has a track record of shaking up old assumptions. As president-elect, he took a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, breaking decades of protocol and immediately triggering protests from Beijing. Since then, the U.S.–China relationship has grown more adversarial, but the basic legal framework around Taiwan has remained in place. The question now is whether Trump uses the meeting with Xi to double down on ambiguity, trade Taiwan issues for concessions elsewhere, or push toward a more explicit security alignment.

Signals to Taipei and the region

Every word that emerges from the Trump–Xi meeting will be parsed in Taipei, Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, and beyond. Taiwan’s leaders will be looking for explicit mention of the Taiwan Relations Act, continued arms sales, and support for meaningful participation in international organizations. Japan and Australia will be watching for signs that Washington is serious about collective deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, not just rhetorical support.

If the final communiqués downplay Taiwan or speak vaguely about “respecting each side’s core interests,” regional governments will read that as a concession to Beijing. If they explicitly reinforce the importance of peace and stability in the Strait and the role of U.S. law in shaping policy, that will reassure allies but could invite sharper retaliation from China. There is no risk-free script.

Trade and Economic Concerns Entangled with Taiwan

The call between Xi and Trump did not stop at security issues. Trade and economic friction remain central to U.S.–China tensions, and they run straight through the Taiwan question. After years of tit-for-tat tariffs and counter-tariffs, China recently announced new hikes on U.S. goods, with average tariffs climbing into triple-digit territory on sensitive categories. Although a temporary 90-day pause has been agreed in the latest round of trade talks, that ceasefire is fragile and highly conditional.

Taiwan sits at the heart of several of these economic disputes, especially in advanced semiconductors. Taiwanese firms dominate global production of cutting-edge chips used in everything from smartphones to weapons systems. Both Washington and Beijing view access to Taiwan’s technology and manufacturing base as strategically vital. Any escalation over Taiwan, even short of conflict, could disrupt supply chains and send shock waves through global markets.

Within the United States, business leaders are pressing Trump to use the April meeting to de-risk, not decouple. That means securing clearer rules of the road on technology exports, intellectual property, and investment screening, while avoiding sudden moves that could trigger capital flight or production shutdowns. Beijing, meanwhile, is likely to tie progress on trade to Washington’s handling of Taiwan, signaling that greater economic cooperation is only possible if the United States “respects China’s core interests” on the island.

Geopolitical Ramifications Beyond Taiwan

The Trump–Xi meeting will ripple far beyond the Strait. U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific have spent the last several years adjusting their own policies to a world in which competition between Washington and Beijing is structural, not episodic.

Japan has increased defense spending and sharpened its planning for a contingency involving Taiwan, recognizing that a conflict there would immediately affect Japanese territory and sea lanes. Australia has deepened its security cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom through AUKUS, aiming to field nuclear-powered submarines and more advanced capabilities that could play a role in deterring Chinese moves near Taiwan. South Korea, the Philippines, and Southeast Asian states are all recalibrating, trying to balance economic ties to China with security ties to the United States.

If Trump and Xi emerge from their April meeting with a narrative of “stabilization” and modest agreements on crisis communications, some of the immediate fear around a sudden Taiwan crisis may ease. But if the talks produce only hardened talking points, mutual accusations, and renewed tariff threats, governments around the region will accelerate their own hedging strategies, including closer security cooperation that Beijing will see as containment.

Ukraine, Deterrence, and Lessons for Taiwan

Looming over the entire conversation is the war in Ukraine. Beijing has watched how Western support for Kyiv has played out: large flows of weapons and financial aid, strict but imperfect sanctions on Russia, and no direct NATO combat involvement. Moscow has paid a huge price but has not been forced to reverse its territorial gains entirely.

For planners in China and the United States, the question is whether a Taiwan contingency would follow a similar pattern or something much more explosive. If Xi concludes that Washington will respond to a move on Taiwan with sanctions and indirect military support but avoid direct conflict, he may see the risks as manageable. If Trump convinces Xi that any attempt to seize Taiwan would trigger a broader war with the United States and its allies, deterrence might hold. Either way, the Ukraine experience informs how both sides think about costs, thresholds, and long-term endurance.

Bottom Line

Xi Jinping’s call to Trump and their planned April summit are not just another round of great-power theater. They are a stress test of the entire post-1979 framework that has kept the peace around Taiwan, even as power balances and political systems have shifted.

The stakes are enormous. For Taiwan, the meeting could clarify whether the United States is prepared to back its de facto ally in more than symbolic terms. For China, it is an opportunity to press its case that Taiwan is non-negotiable while probing for economic concessions. For the United States, it is a moment to decide whether strategic ambiguity still serves its interests or whether a more explicit commitment is necessary, despite the risks.

However the Trump–Xi encounter plays out, the world will read it as a signal about the future of the Taiwan Strait. A careful, clear reaffirmation of peaceful principles could buy time and space for deterrence to work. A misstep, an off-hand remark, or a perceived concession could instead accelerate the countdown to a crisis that no one is truly prepared to manage.

Further Reading

Taiwan Relations Act – U.S. Congress
Full text of the law that underpins U.S. policy toward Taiwan, including security and diplomatic provisions.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479

Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations – Congressional Research Service
Current overview of U.S.–Taiwan relations, cross-Strait tensions, and the legal framework governing unofficial ties.
https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10275

China will never renounce right to use force over Taiwan – Reuters
Reporting on Xi Jinping’s comments about using force if needed to achieve unification with Taiwan.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xi-china-will-never-renounce-right-use-force-over-taiwan-2022-10-16/

China says it ‘absolutely will not’ rule out use of force over Taiwan – Reuters
Recent reinforcement of Beijing’s hard line on Taiwan, tied to the planned Trump–Xi meeting.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-says-it-absolutely-will-not-rule-out-use-force-over-taiwan-2025-10-29/

Strategic Ambiguity on Taiwan Has Run Its Course – U.S. Naval Institute
Argument that the United States should reconsider its long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/march/strategic-ambiguity-taiwan-has-run-its-course

Should the USA Maintain Its Policy of Strategic Ambiguity Towards Taiwan? – The Heritage Foundation
Commentary assessing the benefits and risks of continuing strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait.
https://www.heritage.org/china/commentary/should-the-usa-maintain-its-policy-strategic-ambiguity-towards-taiwan

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